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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Allan Evans. State (INR)

(DIA)

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Colonel Paul E. Pigue, USA (ACSI)

Captain G. K. Nicodemus, USN (ONI)

Colonel A. E. Stoll, USAF (AFNIEBB)

Chief,

50X1

Policy Staff, NSA

SUBJECT:

SNIE 30-2-63: THE ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS
OF THE UAR AND ISRAEL

1. The attached memorandum requesting a Special National Intelligence Estimate on the advanced weapons programs of the UAR and Israel has been received from the Department of State.

2. Your representatives are requested to meet with us to discuss these terms of reference on 19 April at 1000 at CIA Headquarters and to provide informal contributions, including such written contributions on the technical aspects as possible. In addition, any information available on the costs and economic implications of the UAR and Israeli advanced weapons programs would be helpful.

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Executive Officer
National Estimates

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
John A. McCone,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Request for Special National Intelligence Estimate
on Advanced Weapons Programs of the United Arab
Republic and Israel

In view of the charges recently made by Israel with regard to the activities of European scientists in the development of weapons in the UAR, and the implications of these charges for the peace and security of the Near East area, the Department of State requests that a Special National Intelligence Estimate be produced as a matter of urgency on the advanced weapons programs and capabilities of the UAR and Israel.

The estimate should include the following elements:

- (1) A comprehensive round-up of available intelligence on UAR and Israeli developmental programs and capabilities in the fields of nuclear weapons, missiles, and bacteriological, chemical, and radiological warfare.
- (2) The nature and importance of the foreign governmental and private assistance in these fields obtained by the two countries.
- (3) The military and strategic significance of the advanced weapons programs of the two countries.
- (4) The psychological and political implications of these programs.

We believe that this estimate should be treated as a matter of urgency, and suggest that it be scheduled for approval by the USIB on May 1, 1963.

Thomas L. Hughes

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